On
November 6 the voters of Oklahoma, following in the footsteps of voters in
California (1996), Washington (1998), Michigan (2006), Nebraska (2008), and
Arizona (2010), passed a constitutional amendment that
prohibits the state from offering "preferred treatment" or engaging in
discrimination based on race, color, gender, or ethnicity. On November 15 eight
of the fifteen judges of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, over vigorous dissents,
that the nearly identical Michigan amendment requiring the state to treat all
its residents without regard to their race violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment. Really.
As
Roger Clegg just noted, this
decision will almost certainly be reviewed by the Supreme Court, not primarily
because it is unusually stupid but because it conflicts with both old and recent decisions of even the
notoriously liberal Ninth Circuit. Ironically, this decision is so bad that it
may actually do some good before the Court can review it. In flatly rejecting
the same argument made in the Michigan case (by the same lawyer) against
California's Prop. 209, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled in April
that "Grutter upheld as permissible
certain race-based affirmative action programs. It did not hold that such
programs are constitutionally required."
In holding that states are effectively prohibited from deciding that race-based
preferences are impermissible, the Sixth Circuit's overreaching Egregious Eight
may have inadvertently driven a stake through the heart of affirmative action.
Their extreme decision may persuade Justice Kennedy and hence a conservative
majority to hold in the upcoming Fisher
decision that Grutter must be gutted,
not tweaked, that the only "way to stop discrimination on the basis of race,"
as Chief Justice Roberts famously said in Parents Involved, "is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."
Noting
the great gulf separating the views on racial preference held by the nation's
opinion leaders and elites, including leaders and faculty of both public and
private universities, Richard Kahlenberg recently
quoted Richard Sander's and Stuart Taylor Jr.'s observation in their terrific
new book, Mismatch, "We can think of no
other public issue in which the leadership class displays such cohesion in the
face of a largely opposite view among Americans in general."
In
large part that's because most Americans continue to define discrimination as
distributing benefits or burdens based on race while opinion leaders in
editorial and university offices, Hollywood and Madison Avenue, board rooms,
and nearly all elected and appointed Democrats have abandoned that traditional
definition and instead regard discrimination as anything that interferes with
promoting "diversity," which in practice means discriminating against white and
Asians in order to admit or hire more blacks and Hispanics. Thus the Sixth
Circuit thought it unfair that the citizens of Michigan prohibited
"race-conscious" admissions, i.e., preferential treatment based on race, while
allowing "a legacy-conscious admissions policy." Whatever the merits or wisdom
of legacy preference, it cannot be said that its intent or effect is to
discriminate against minorities. Indeed, for over a generation now minorities
have been admitted to selective institutions in greater numbers than if they
had been held to the same standards as whites and Asians, and thus it is quite
likely that legacy preferences on balance now actually benefit minorities.
Their
"legacy conscious admissions" comparison reveals that the Sixth Circuit based its
decision on the assumption that "race-conscious" admissions have the intent and
effect of benefitting minorities. The massive amount of evidence presented in
the "mismatch" scholarship of Sander, Taylor, and now many others, however, has
demonstrated that in fact "race conscious" admissions actually does serious and
lasting damage to its ostensible "beneficiaries."
I
say "ostensible" and put "beneficiaries" in quotes because for anyone who
credits the mantra-like justifications for "race conscious" admissions offered
by its proponents, it's clear that lowering the bar for blacks and Hispanics is
not intended as a benefit to them -- after all, they would receive whatever
benefits "diversity" offers at less selective institutions -- but to the whites
and Asians whose education is said to require being exposed to them.
In
any event, the noxious belief of the Sixth Circuit and all supporters of racial
preference that discrimination against some groups should be legal if it
benefits other groups reveals how thoroughly American liberalism has abandoned
the civil rights ideal that was its heart and soul from the1830s through the
1960s.

