In November, I reviewed the new, supposedly
"untold" story of 20th century U.S. history penned by Oliver Stone
and American University professor Peter Kuznick. (Parents of American
University students can spend their tuition dollars having their children
enroll in Kuznick's course, "Oliver Stone's
America.") In the review, I mentioned that Princeton professor Sean Wilentz had
criticized Stone and Kuznick's work as well.
Wilentz's review, in New
York Review of Books, is now out. He concludes that the"book is less a work of history than a skewed
political document, restating and updating a view of the world that the
independent radical Dwight Macdonald once likened to a fog, 'caused by the warm
winds of the liberal Gulf Stream coming in contact with the Soviet glacier'--but
now more than twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet empire."
Wilentz correctly observes just how
little is either "new" or "untold" in the Stone/Kuznick tale--something that the
duo now appears to concede. They now claim that their version of the past is
not untold but somehow unlearned, at least among the media and in "those parts
of America that cling to the notion of American exceptionalism." Stone and
Kuznick don't seem at all sheepish about titling their opus in a misleading
fashion.
At its most basic level, Wilentz notes,
and quite apart from its overall ultra-revisionist message, the Stone/Kuznick
book is simply bad history. He takes apart their portrayal of the 1944
Democratic National Convention, at which the book's hero, then-Vice President
Henry Wallace, was dumped from FDR's ticket. Far from an ideological crusade
against a peace-oriented visionary, Wilentz notes that Wallace had alienated
virtually every key player in the Democratic Party, and that FDR had signed off
to replacing him. Since this evidence doesn't fit the Stone/Kuznick
preconceptions, they just ignore it.
One quibble with the Wilentz review. Challening
the Stone/Kuznick claim that the "'revisionist narrative' that informs their
book has in truth become 'the dominant narrative among university-based
historians,'" Wilentz correctly points to the outstanding work of
non-revisionist diplomatic historians such as John Lewis Gaddis and Melvyn
Leffler. Yet as fewer and fewer history departments make hires in diplomatic
(or even political) history, there's no particular reason to believe that the
Stone/Kuznick fantasy isn't, in fact, "the dominant narrative among
university-based historians." And if it's not, given current hiring patterns, it
probably will be soon.

