By Richard Vedder
Every decade or so, Charles Murray writes a blockbuster book captivating America. First came Losing Ground, focusing attention on our dysfunctional system of public assistance, and, along with Richard Herrnstein, The Bell Curve, a controversial but rigorous examination of the role played by cognitive endowments in American life. I suspect his new book, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010, will be another mega hit. Based on a quick read, Murray demonstrates the growing gaps between affluent upper-middle-class Americans and their blue-collar, lower-income counterparts. He confines his analysis to whites to avoid all sorts of unrelated side issues, including the tendency to see the growing gap between Americans as primarily a problem of race, ethnicity or bias.
Murray's thesis is simple: a powerful new class has emerged in America, based on cognitive and educational homogamy--the interbreeding of individuals with like characteristics. Colleges and universities have played a key role--particularly the elite institutions, which attract almost no one outside the top ten percent of the nation's cognitive talent. (Fifty years ago, only three percent of Americans graduated from college, and the elite institutions tended to attract the well-connected and the economically successful, not necessarily the brightest.) These institutions now function as sorting mechanisms. The exceptionally bright now tend to meet and then marry similarly bright partners. In addition to building a culture vastly different from that of mainstream America, they perpetuate the advantages that high levels of cognitive skills offer. As a result, Murray concludes, "Highly disproportionate numbers of exceptionally able children in the next generation will come from parents in the upper-middle class, and more specifically from parents who are already part of the broad elite." As the new class pulls away from mainstream America, so does the discouraged underclass--now made up of all ethnicities--giving up on work, family and community.
Evidence by others confirms much of this: what economists call "intergenerational income mobility" seems to be declining, so the observations of de Tocqueville and others that Americans of lower stations in life can in one generation very easily attain wealth and power seem to be less true than previously. One could say "the American Dream" is a diminished force in American life, and with that, American economic exceptionalism is partially imperiled.
We must begin, of course, with primary and secondary education. The quality of public schools in the relatively down-market areas in which most blue-collar folks live has declined by almost any measure over the past half century, while the affluent suburban schools that the upper middle class attend have probably suffered less. The good quality, mostly inner-city Catholic schools that many students from blue-collar families attended have had significant enrollment declines since 1950. The gap between the affluent and less affluent with respect to preparation for college, in short, has almost certainly widened.
At the college level, as Murray demonstrates, the gap between the academic record of entering students at, say, Harvard, the University of Michigan, and Kansas State University in 1950 was probably noticeable and real, but much less than it is today. Harvard today can have an all-valedictorian class if it wishes, but that was not so in 1950. Kansas State is lucky today, I suspect, if two percent of those enrolled were at the top of their high school class.
One reason for this is that the top universities have not expanded enrollments. Harvard, if it did not want to expand in Massachusetts, could have developed Harvard of the South and Harvard of the West, but it did not--it no doubt felt that would hurt its prestige. Access has been a lower priority than maintaining selectivity and top college rankings. As the demand for higher education rose, more students have attended schools of lesser distinction--Western Michigan University instead of the University of Michigan, for example.
Statistical evidence shows the gap within the higher education sector has grown. Spending per student has grown much more at the elite private schools than at even respected flagship universities, and many blue-collar workers attend community colleges where per-student spending has remained relatively flat over time. In the first US News & World Report rankings using current methodology in 1988, there were eight public universities in the top 25 national institutions but now only three. Excepting the service academies, there are only no public institutions in the top 40 in the current Forbes rankings. The better private schools, while using financial aid to ease the burden of low-income students, nonetheless favor students with good academic promise, a group excluding many blue-collar kids attending mediocre public primary and secondary schools.
Moreover, the income advantage associated with college credentials has grown dramatically. The conventional view is that "in this high tech age, we need more highly skilled workers requiring a college degree." Yet, judging from a look at data on the PayScale.com web site, I suspect a majority of the recent increase in the number of college-degree holders in often low-paying jobs (historically held by high school grads) has come from blue collar-intensive schools like Cleveland State University, whose enrollments have soared since 1950. Supply has created its own demand, so even bars can insist on college degrees for bartenders (we have 107,000 of them).
We now have two tiers of higher education: first, truly elite private schools (and maybe a dozen or so public flagship universities like the universities of Michigan, Illinois, Virginia, North Carolina, and California--several campuses) whose graduates are sought for good managerial, technical and professional jobs. Second, we have the non-highly selective schools, mostly public, but also less distinguished private schools as well as some for profit institutions. The students going to the first group of schools--10 to 15 percent of the total--far outdistance the others, career-wise. No longer is a college degree itself almost automatically a ticket to a privileged life.
Building on Murray's insights, I would note that endemic certification inflation largely reflects public policy. Too many kids go to college because of large government subsidies, watering down educational quality and giving us too many college graduates for the good jobs available. Griggs v. Duke Power and some legislative actions have eroded one means, employment testing, that bright kids from blue-collar families once had to certify their competency for responsible jobs to potential employers, because companies are fearful of legal liabilities. And, of course, our public K-12 schools have become more unequal in their results because of injudicious public policies, including allowing labor unions de facto veto power over meaningful reforms like vouchers and other pro-competitive measures.
To me, however, inequality itself is far from a dirty word--differences in income, for example, are vital to providing the incentives that propel prosperity. Yet the evidence that equality of opportunity--not results--is in decline is disheartening. Murray's book tells a compelling, if sometimes, depressing story. Like him, I believe that that higher education has been more part of the problem, rather than the solution, in America's "coming apart."
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Richard Vedder is director of the Center for College Affordability
and Productivity, teaches at Ohio University and is an adjunct scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute.

